This chapter first looks at the ancient Greek roots of the word “atheism,” and raises questions about both the “a-“ and the “theism” parts of the word. Next, the chapter considers the word’s various definitions through history and the distinction between “positive” and “negative” atheism. Finally, the chapter examines how we should decide which definition of “atheism” to choose.

This chapter introduces three terms—“agnosticism,” “nonreligion,” and “secular”—which are entangled with the concept of “atheism” before mapping their similarities and differences in different contexts. The take-home message throughout should be that difference is in the eye of the beholder and depends on who is utilizing the terms and for what purpose.

Up until fifteen years ago, atheism and related topics had received only scant, partial, and rare attention from social scientists. Now there’s a thriving community of researchers, a slew of books and articles, two dedicated journals, regular international conferences, and several five- and six-figure research projects. Why the sudden interest? And why the previous lack of interest? What changed, how, and when?

Researchers always negotiate their own beliefs and values when they conduct research, and this issue is particularly acute around religious and nonreligious worldviews, which, like political convictions, often attract strong feelings. This chapter explores whether and how researchers achieve neutrality in their work.

The twenty-first century has seen a profound transformation in how atheism is thought about and studied by researchers. This chapter describes the shift from religion- to atheism-centred methodologies and how this has expanded and altered not only what we want to know about atheism but how we go about finding it out.

Knowing how to measure atheism requires a clear understanding of atheism. Atheism is the absence of belief in a god, gods, or higher powers. Questions to measure atheism can measure whether someone believes in a specific god, in any gods, or in any higher powers. Additional questions may attempt to capture confidence in one’s atheism or whether or not one believes that it is possible to develop knowledge about a god, which would measure agnosticism. Finally, asking whether people have heard about specific gods and reject the existence of gods or simply have not heard about a god would allow for a measure of positive or negative atheism.

This chapter looks as the emergence of the term atheism, its original meaning, and its subsequent development into a defintion recognisable by us in the contemporary world. It also examines the process by which it was adopted as a term of self-definiton.

Who decides who is “famous”, and how might we assess varying degrees of fame? Does the title of this chapter refer to people who are famous for being atheists? People who are famous for other reasons but who are also atheists? Or those who are important to the history of atheism but who might not have (been) identified as atheists? Are we interested in fame among atheists or among general populations? This chapter will highlight some “famous atheists” from a variety of sociohistorical contexts while attempting to address some of these questions.

Contemporary atheists like to claim Darwin as one of their own. However the story of the evolution of Darwin’s religious views confirms that he was never an atheist, even when he raised the most difficult questions about how humans can know that a God exists.

Most great scientists have not been atheists. Many early modern great scientists, like Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) and Robert Boyle (1627-1691) were Christians. Up until the 20th century, most scientists have held standard or non-standard religious, mostly Christian, beliefs. In the last hundred years or so, the sciences have gone through a process of secularization, which has produced many great scientists, who are atheists. However, some great scientists are still religious.

“New Atheism” is a term that emerged at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It can refer to a variety of things, from specific works of particular (white male) authors, to a much broader discursive movement. Just how “new” this form of atheism is, and what impact it might have had, or continue to have, remain open questions and depend on who is doing the asking.

This chapter discusses whether the concept of atheistic religion makes sense and in what conditions. It suggests that the question about atheistic religions raises another, perhaps more interesting question: “What is at stake when people make claims about some religion being atheistic?”

Historical studies on atheism have opened the debate to analyse atheistic positions in “pre-modern” historical contexts. This chapter continues that path by questioning whether we can observe “atheists” in the Greco-Roman context. This exercise cannot be carried out without questioning the concepts we currently have associated with atheism. Having discussed the differences between modern and ancient terms, we can now venture to analyse atheistic positions in the ancient world. Did the word “atheist” exist in the Greek and Latin language? Were there people who identified themselves as “atheists”? Were there movements that questioned the existence of gods in the Greek philosophical schools? The chapter gives a succinct answer to all these questions.

Jewish conceptions of, and attitudes towards, atheism have changed over time. Jewish biblical tradition tended to be concerned more about practical, rather than philosophical, atheism. In the Talmud, heretics were often condemned for atheistic tendencies, such the belief in God’s existence or unity, or for a loss of faith due to the problem evil as in the case of Acher. The great medieval authority Maimonides asserted that atheistic ideas could lead to loss of one’s place in the World to Come, even as his own naturalistic teachings on prophecy and miracles and God’s unknowability, prepared the ground for later Jewish scepticism. In the early-modern period it became possible for highly heterodox Jews such as Spinzoa to emerge; later non-believing Jews would be regarded as atheists for denying the authority of scripture, divine creation, divine providence, and even the divine origins of morality. In the modern period, non-Jewish Jews are commonplace, rejecting supernaturalism as part of the rejection of traditional religious authority and the idea that their Jewishness should be defined in terms of religion.

Although there is no direct equivalent of “atheism” in pre-modern Asian languages, early and medieval Indian sources of the Hindu traditions declare Buddhism to be “non-theistic,” and, indeed, Buddhists themselves declared that God, or gods, are largely irrelevant if the aim is to reach final liberation from suffering. This harmonizes with the philosophical view of Buddhist scholars that reality, and even the reality of Gods, is illusionary and inaccessible. On the other hand, in various Buddhist traditions gods or other supernatural beings have significance. So, why has Buddhism been declared to be atheistic? The contribution will move on to look into the early European missionary sources that declared Buddhism to be a “cult of nothingness,” followed by some remarks on European philosophers’ comments of Buddhism as atheism. Finally, in the surge of Western empirical sciences, Buddhist converts and Asian Buddhist modernists themselves declared Buddhism to be atheism, or, at least, compatible with a scientific naturalism. The latest move are Western Buddhists that explicitly aim to transform Buddhism into a belief-free “Atheism” (e.g.,Steven Batchelor), which will subsequently be contrasted with less ambitious or confrontative projects of Eastern Buddhist modernists such as the current Dalai Lama.

This chapter looks at the origins of the Christian atheism movement in the USA in the 1960s. It also looks at later variants, particularly Christian non-realism in the UK in the 1980s, as well as more recent usages of the term in a sociological context.

The chapter surveys the ways in which the Qur’an engages with notions of disbelief. The Qur’an and its exegetes did not really consider the possibility of atheism per se, although they did reflect on various facets of kufr, “disbelief,” and shirk, “associating other beings with God.” Moreover, the chapter presents a prominent medieval Muslim freethinker, Ibn al-Rawandi, who vehemently criticized aspects of formalized religion, though he cannot necessarily be called an atheist.

In order to answer this question, we need to unpack it. What is meant by Muslim countries? What is meant by atheism in the context of Muslim countries? Is it difficult to be or to show non-belief? What kind of difficulties and consequences might atheists experience? Atheism is a sensitive issue, even more so for women, but not in all countries, not for everyone to the same extent, and also depending on whether, how and where you disclose your nonreligion. Yet despite it being difficult, there appears to be a growing number of people who identify as atheists in many Muslim countries.

To answer the question of the relation between Pagans, Satanists and Atheists, the chapter unpacks implicit assumptions, reductive judgments and conflations of the three. It then examines atheism and anti-theism as found within Pagan and Satanic milieux. Neither Pagans nor Satanists are merely atheists; atheists are not necessarily heathens or Satanists either.

Taking a critical stance towards the terms “atheists”, “religious people”, and “dialogue” this chapter explores what kind of interaction might be termed “interworldview dialogue”. It notes various examples of exchanges using the fourfold typology of dialogue (life, action, theological exchange, religious experience) as a frame to consider a variety of encounters of more or less irenic or polemical interaction.

In this chapter, the question ‘Is Atheism a Religion, Belief-System or a Worldview?’ is treated as a thought experiment conducted to enable critical reflection upon the word “atheism” through juxtaposition with other terms, rather than as an opportunity for delineating boundaries and definitions.

This chapter uses data from the World Values Survey, the European Values Study, and the International Social Survey Program to identify the most atheistic societies in the world. This is accomplished by examining levels of (1) self-defined atheism and (2) nonbelief in God. The chapter also explains how these measures differ at the cross-national scale.

There are several competing and complementary theories of why some societies are more atheistic than others. Some theories propose that there are universal explanatory mechanisms or at least correlation between the level of atheism and social structure, whereas other theories suggest that historical reasons are most plausible in answering the question.

Scholars are somewhat divided in their assessments of whether the internet enhances secularization or opens up new areas for religions to flourish. This chapter suggest that the internet itself might be seen as a medium that advances secularization, at least to a moderate degree. Moreover, atheists have found the internet to be very beneficial to them. This is even more the case in countries where atheism and its public expressions are forbidden or repressed.

On the basis on quantitative and qualitative studies, this chapter clarifies how atheists in general differ from others in terms of age, gender, education, political preferences and other sociodemographic characteristics.

In the majority of countries worldwide, a larger proportion of young people do not believe in God or a Higher Power, compared with older generations. Not all atheists are currently young people, but a higher proportion are. This demographic phenomenon is mainly explained in the secular transition framework by generational change and replacement.

There are so few Black Atheists in the United States for a number of reasons. The factors that tend to correlate with being Atheist in America tend to negatively correlate with Black Americans (ie: income, education level, exposure to other Atheists). This coupled with the historical centrality and importance of the ‘Black Church’ to Black America as a whole, and the stigma against Atheists that arose as a result, begin to explain why there are so few Black Atheists in The United States.

The chapter looks at the role of migration for religiosity. Migration tends to make people sensitive for their own beliefs and opens a window of opportunity for change. The new social environment affects migrants, but equally important is the society’s inclusiveness. Repressed group may hold to their previous views, whereas others tend to become more like the majority population.

Atheism has related to politics in various ways. In the ancient world atheism was seen as a threat to a social order rooted in religion. In its contemporary form, atheists have formed campaigns to challenge religious power and privilege. Atheism has internal politics too, with power struggles and disputes around issues such as race and gender.

This chapter examines whether secularization had an impact on the rise of racism since about 1500. It explores different approaches to this question and arguments from both sides. One can point, for example, to things like Christian anti-Semitism and justifications for slavery. But one can also point to the development of secular scientific racism which divided humanity into a hierarchy of distinct racial groups. The article concludes by suggesting that neither Christianity nor atheism are inherently racist or antiracist.

Since 9/11, academics have researched whether religions promote violence. They have found a mixed picture: sometimes yes but most often no. For comparison, they have examined ‘atheist’ regimes, like the USSR. We cannot come to any sound conclusions about a causal relationship between atheism and peace. But we can begin to ask other interesting questions about the relationship between peace, violence and atheism.

This chapter addresses the different constellations between atheism and communism and the theoretical basis for antireligious attitude within Marxist thinking, focusing specifically on atheism in the Soviet Union, one of the best-known communist experiments.

Being an atheist does not necessarily mean that you will identify more with the political left than the right. However, atheism has often been considered to be a threat to the existing social order and thus associated more with left-wing worldviews. In recent times some of the most famous atheists have promoted views which dovetail with aspects of neoconservatism, yet many others tie atheism to wider struggles for equality. Indeed, in general, atheists tend to be more left-liberal in their political attitudes than those who are religiously affiliated.

Even talented atheist political leaders need to think carefully about how they refer to God and religion in their campaigns. For example, presidential candidates in the United States are expected to have a religious affiliation, and polls suggest that many electors would not vote for an openly atheist candidate. However, the more secular political context in the United Kingdom means that it is very possible for an atheist to become the British prime minister. Indeed, within wider Europe there have been instances of atheists being elected as national leaders, and in Australia the atheist Julia Gillard became prime minister (2010-13).

This chapter considers the intersection of atheism and law. Specifically, it examines legal protections for atheists (and other nonreligious people) through human rights guarantees of the freedom of and from religion. The chapter also explores the ways that religion is subtly privileged in, for example, courts mandating attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous (with its reference to a “higher power”) or the persistence of religious symbols in public institutions. Despite this, the chapter argues that the growth of the numbers of atheists and nonreligious people in recent years has the potential to shift legal frameworks dealing with religion.

Not all atheists actively seek to change people’s minds about religion, but those that do tend to focus on three main reasons. First, atheists consider the claims made by religion to be wrong. Second, atheists often claim that religious beliefs produce negative consequences, such as promoting violence and discrimination. Third, atheists may seek to promote atheist ideas as a way of normalising non-religious views and gaining equal rights for atheists.

Prejudice is thinking differently about people with some characteristic, usually in a negative way. Discrimination is treating people differently on the basis of some characteristic they hold. There is robust research indicating that there is widespread prejudice against atheists in many countries, though not all countries. The extent to which that prejudice translates into discrimination varies, but there is compelling evidence that many atheists experience discrimination, though it varies in severity.

The chapter describes typical stereotypes about atheists and explains the psychological mechanisms behind them.

A common presumption is that atheists almost never belong to religious organizations. However, recent data (International Social Survey Program 2018) suggest that a significant portion of nonbelievers, across many countries, do in fact identify with a religious group. This chapter discusses reasons grounded in culture, history, politics, and family to explain why some atheists maintain a connection to organized religion.

In the past, secular humanists have formed church-like structures, with memberships and leaders resembling clergy. In other societies, atheists have organized debating and intellectual societies. Along with this continuing group formation, today we see significant online involvement among secularists.

Men have played a disproportionate role in organized secularism. But this pattern is changing to a certain extent as women have become less religious, and as feminist activists have become more involved in atheist movements and groups.

The article explores the relationship of selected main atheist thinkers (such as Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, Ayaan Hirsi Ali) to women and feminism, but also introduces feminist atheism in everyday life and in atheist organisations. Some researchers suggest that all feminists should be atheists, and the values atheists appreciate (such as equality) suggest that atheists should support feminism – but the experiences of feminists within atheist circles indicate that they do not.

It is a widely spread assumption, at least in Europe and North America, that the mainstream media is somewhat antireligious. This chapter argues against this view by suggesting that if media representations of atheism are taken into account, it is clear that the mainstream media, while offering space for debate on religion and atheism, is usually not on the side of outspoken atheists.

This chapter examines literary and visual depictions of unbelief from the early modern period to the present. By highlighting diverse portrayals of atheistic worlds and characters, the chapter contends that attitudes toward unbelief are not merely shaped by logical arguments and rational debate but by the stories we tell ourselves about godlessness.

It is safe to suggest that atheism has not been a particularly visible theme in Western popular culture. By examining films, television and popular music, this brief survey shows that atheism and atheists are not fully invisible in popular culture. Popular culture products addressing atheist identities proudly, rather than stereotypically in a negative manner, have become more common, but it is still easier to find examples of implicit atheistic themes, which primarily means criticism of religion.

Discusses intergenerational transmission of atheism and the various factors that influence the process of developing a non-religious worldview.

This chapter addresses this question by focusing on two main aspects. First, it explores the phases a person may go through to become an atheist. Second, it examines the triggers or motivations that initiate or lead to such a process. Drawing on sociological and psychological literature, the chapter offers a nuanced account of a rather complex process, highlighting the multiplicity of possible paths and factors involved.

One argumentative strategy is to insist that atheism is the default assumption and needs no positive evidence for its support. Another strategy invokes the success of science as an epistemic guideline to our metaphysical views: since the sciences do not need God as an explanatory factor, we can safely disregard God from our metaphysics. Finally, atheists have developed powerful arguments against the existence of God, like the argument from evil and the argument from the hiddenness of God.

The reality of evil is, according to many atheists, one of the strongest reasons for rejecting any theistic belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God. The chapter discusses the argument from evil in its atheistic employment, while also drawing attention to the opposition between theodicism and antitheodicism, which can be argued to cut across the one between theism and atheism.

People often assume that atheists are unable to cope with their own mortality without a belief in God or gods, though recent research findings suggest otherwise. This chapter examines some of these findings in greater detail by highlighting recent studies and personal narratives related to coping with mortality as an atheist.

Atheists source their values from the same wellsprings that all humans do: biology, culture, and reason. Evolution equips newborns with the raw materials of morality. Culture and socialization shape and constrain the developing person’s moral sentiments. Reason can refine those values. Of course, a complex dance takes place between these broad sources—evolution, culture, reason—and there is no simple way to spell out how they bestow any human with values. The dance includes friendships, real-life mentors, fictional heroes, value-laden myths, sorrow, hugs, organized sports, late night reflection when sleep won’t arrive, DNA, the sting of unfairness when someone cuts in line, and much more. Perhaps the only place where atheists don’t get their values is belief in God, which they lack. While the theist appears to have a simple answer to the origin of their values—e.g., “God” or “religion”—such responses cloak an equally complex dance of ideas and events and evolutionary heritage. In total, the question of where atheists get their values is really a question of where humans get their values.

While we can examine survey and interview data to discern whether or not atheists have beliefs in other supernatural phenomena, we should also be aware of how some interested parties frame the answers to suit their own interests. As part of the Understanding Unbelief programme, we found that most (though not all) atheists and agnostics had beliefs in some mix of supernatural phenomena. Our findings problematize common explanations by religious individuals that atheists reject belief in God because of a desire to engage in immorality and by atheists that their atheism is solely a result of rational thinking.

If religion is defined as an institution that is organised around transcendent, other-worldly beliefs and phenomena, and a religious experience is a moment when such numinous, other-worldly beings or feelings are sensed then, yes, research clearly shows that atheists have such experiences. The term ‘atheist’ merely signals a disbelief in god, not a disbelief in ghosts or granny’s enduring spirit.

This discussion will address this question in a unique way, using as an example a United States Supreme Court decision defending the religious right of an Atheist to use “profane” texts in the same way a Christian might use the Bible to justify his conscientious objection to fighting in the Vietnam War on religious grounds.

Historically tied to religion, rituals have been a contentious topic in the atheist movement. This contribution briefly explores this both internally within the movement itself as well as more generally. We find a new interest in rituals among atheists and secular humanists.

This chapter deals with the emergence of the concept “atheist spirituality” and proposes that it could be understood as a notion of meaning-making within an atheist worldview, or as a bridge-building strategy between religious and non-religious communities.

Atheists are just as moral as religious people, and in some respects more moral. Like everyone else, atheists value community, compassion, charity, and peace over their opposites. However, since much of the world associates goodness with God or religion, atheist morality is viewed with suspicion. If atheists believe God isn’t watching over their actions, then what’s stopping them from stealing, lying, and cheating with abandon? It turns out that what stops atheists is probably what is stopping religious folks too: natural and social forces. This helps explain why some of the most morally prosperous countries are high in atheism—it also explains why full-fledged believers sometimes commit the worst sins. When people organically and gradually shed their religious and theistic views, it often coincides with societal health. Ultimately, learning your neighbor sleeps in on Sundays should give you no pause.

Being non-religious seems to coincide with liberal tendencies and importance of rationality, as well as relatively high tolerance of various minority groups (e.g. sexual or racial/ethnic minorities). Does this mean that nonbelievers are equally tolerant of all groups, or do they have group biases of their own? This chapter reviews some of the recent research demonstrating that, while nonbelievers do show a degree of intolerance toward their ideological opposition (e.g., religious and illiberal people), this intolerance seems to be limited and context-dependent.

Atheists hold varying attitudes toward religion because of different exposures to and experiences with a variety of religions around the world. In Canada and the United States, atheists are inclined to value religions that they perceive as more “inclusive” and tolerant – most notably, Buddhism – while reserving their disapproval for religions believed to be “exclusive” and intolerant, including notably Evangelical Christians, Muslims, Catholics, Mormons, and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

This chapter shows that some atheists see the relevance in meditation practices and community building. Others value the ability of religious institutions to offer support for life passages, provide services that other societal institutions do not offer, and participate in public discussions about the common good. Yet others appreciate the historical contribution religious traditions may have made to present-day societies. Critics maintain that all the benefits are attainable without religious traditions and institutions.

In the chapter, we will talk about how to re-conceptualize the question: is atheism ever directly related to health? Or is it that atheism can be a proxy for deviance or other-ness in religious environments and that the resultant social isolation and stigma cause poor health outcomes? We suggest the latter is more correct, and that as societies secularize, we can expect stigma and social isolation of atheists to decline.

This chapter examines the future of atheism by paying attention to demographic projections and the “demographic disadvantage” of atheists (i.e., lower fertility rates). It also asks whether we can rely on the predictive models concerning the future of atheism and recommends paying attention to the policy functions such models may have.