Enchantment
A Critical Primer
Ian Alexander Cuthbertson [+–]
Ian Alexander Cuthbertson is an independent scholar who is broadly interested in exploring how the category “religion” is deployed to legitimize certain beliefs, practices, and institutions while delegitimizing others. Ian lives in England with his wife Virginia and their son Ciaran and often puts pineapple on pizza.
This book provides an overview of the various ways the concepts enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment have been used both within religious studies scholarship and in related fields. Despite the prevalence of these concepts in recent scholarship, no introductory text on the subject of enchantment has yet been written. The first half of the book provides a concise overview of theoretical work on disenchantment, a critical exploration of empirical evidence for premodern enchantment and modern disenchantment, and an account of how enchantment has been used in scholarly and popular works to mark specific beliefs and practices as unacceptable, dangerous, or delusional. The second half of the book explores recent scholarship on re-enchantment and distinguishes between two main varieties: rational re-enchantment, which involves heightened emotions that are free from negative appraisals of premodern belief in magic and spirits, and spiritual re-enchantment, which involves the recovery of premodern beliefs and practices or the development of new alternative spiritual paths. The final chapter outlines a novel theoretical model for explaining modern enchantment as a variety of playful half-belief. This book will be useful for scholars and students working on a variety of topics including religion in modernity, theories of secularization, conflicts between science and religion, new religious movements, new materialisms, and immanent justifications for environmentalism.
Table of Contents
Prelims
Introduction
Why Enchantment? [+–] 1-9
In the introduction, I situate enchantment as a key concept for engaging with a wide range of conversations both within and outside religious studies scholarship including: descriptions of modernity; accounts of secularization; conflicts between science and religion; differences between pre-modern and modern religious forms; comparisons between pre-modern and modern societies and religious expressions, new materialisms, immanent justifications for environmentalism, and arguments concerning the place of religious justifications in legal proceedings.
Chapter 1
The Disenchantment Thesis [+–] 10-31
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the disenchantment thesis. Popularized by Max Weber, the disenchantment thesis argues that specific modern developments have caused irreversible intellectual and affective changes such that modern individuals prefer scientific explanations over magical ones and are increasingly immune to feelings of fullness, mystery, and awe. Because disenchantment is often described both as an important feature of modernity and as involving important changes to religious belief and practice, I begin the chapter with a brief overview of modernity and secularization. I then provide overviews of the three most well-developed arguments for disenchantment: Max Weber’s arguments concerning intellectualization and rationalization, Charles Taylor’s account of a shift from what he calls porous to buffered selves, and Marcel Gauchet’s description of increased transcendence and the modern shift away from sacral dependence.
Chapter 2
Disenchantment as Modern Myth [+–] 32-49
In this chapter, I consider empirical evidence both for modern disenchantment and for premodern enchantment in an attempt to determine whether disenchantment provides an accurate account of historical changes or whether it is, as some scholars claim, merely an influential but ultimately misleading modern myth. I begin by noting that Max Weber, Charles Taylor, and Marcel Gauchet all fail to provide sufficient evidence to support their claims that the premodern world was enchanted in the first place. I then briefly examine textual and archeological evidence for premodern magical beliefs and practices and consider whether the available evidence is sufficient to support the specific claims concerning disenchantment put forward by each scholar. Next, I consider whether available empirical evidence supports the claim that enchanted beliefs and practices have actually disappeared in the modern world. Drawing on recent surveys, I argue that global levels of belief in magic, spirits, and invisible forces cast doubt on whether disenchantment has, in fact, taken place. Finally, I consider to what extent modern religious forms really are less magical than premodern ones in an attempt to determine whether or not religion has in fact become disenchanted as Weber, Taylor and Gauchet claim.
Chapter 3
Enchantment and Exclusion [+–] 50-70
In this chapter, I describe how enchantment and related terms including magic and superstition have been and continue to be used as markers of difference that exclude particular individuals and groups in various ways. I trace a brief history of the terms magic and superstition in order to show how these common descriptors of enchantment have been used to mark particular beliefs and practices as unacceptable, dangerous, and as worthy of exclusion. First, I outline how both terms were used within religious discourse to exclude unacceptable beliefs and practices. Next, I explore how the meaning of each shifted after the Enlightenment such that both magic and superstition became markers of credulity, faulty reasoning, and intellectual inferiority rather than religious unacceptability. Finally, I show how discourse surrounding magic, superstition, and by extension enchantment works to exclude particular groups and individuals including religious individuals, indigenous persons, people of colour, women, and children from the standard model of modern, intelligent, and rational human beings.
Chapter 4
Rational Re-Enchantment [+–] 71-89
In this chapter, I describe a particular version of re-enchantment in which enchantment primarily involves heightened emotions or affective states and in which re-enchantment therefore involves delight that is free from the delusion associated with premodern belief in magic and spirits. I begin with an overview of the theoretical framework that supports this view of re-enchantment, focusing primarily on the work of Michael Saler and Jane Bennett. I also outline some arguments for secular re-enchantment put forward by a number of scholars working in different fields. Borrowing from Jane Bennett’s description of the various potential sources of enchantment, I organize these accounts of secular re-enchantment into three general categories: culture, technology, and nature. For each category, I provide a brief outline of the specific variety of disenchantment that is apparently being reversed by rational re-enchantment.
Chapter 5
Spiritual Re-Enchantment [+–] 90-108
In this chapter, I describe a different version of re-enchantment, one in which enchantment pertains to interactions with magic, spirits, and invisible forces and re-enchantment involves the recovery of pagan belief and practice or else the creation of new alternative spiritual paths. I begin by outlining the most detailed theoretical account of spiritual re-enchantment, focussing on the work of Christopher Partridge and his description of occulture. I describe a variety of ‘neo-pagan’ new religious movements in which many practitioners both believe in and actively engage with gods, magic, and spirits. Next, I consider a range of popular alternative spiritual beliefs and practices that focus on contact with spirit entities and alternative healing practices and which are often categorized as ‘New Age.’ Finally, I explore the renewed interest in the presence of ghosts and spirits in modern society along with individuals who claim to be able to communicate or interact with them.
Chapter 6
Modern Enchantment [+–] 109-127
In this chapter, I describe my own take on enchantment. I draw upon the theoretical frameworks discussed in previous chapters along with recent philosophical work on the connections and disjunctions between belief and behaviour to propose a novel approach to an understudied variety of modern enchantment – a variety that I refer to as ‘fluid enchantment.’ I begin by outlining the binary model of belief on which the accounts of enchantment, disenchantment, and re-enchantment rely. Next, I outline three accounts of partial belief that challenge the binary model. Finally, I outline the ways the concept fluid enchantment might be used to describe situations and contexts in which individuals partially, ironically, or playfully engage with magical or supernatural beliefs and practices without fully adhering to these beliefs and without necessarily viewing these practices as being straightforwardly effective.
Conclusion
The Future of Enchantment [+–] 128-138
I conclude the book by considering how the concept enchantment might best be deployed in future scholarship. I begin by outlining recent arguments that the term enchantment should be divested of its religious or supernatural connotations and reimagined to refer uniquely to heightened emotions or affective states. I argue that ignoring the ways ‘enchantment’ has been associated with supernatural beliefs and practices impoverishes our ability to accurately describe modern engagement with posited spirits and invisible forces. I then argue that, to the extent enchantment signifies the playful attitude described in chapter six, it may provide a productive space for thinking, believing, and experiencing things otherwise.
