

## Doubtful Food, Doubtful Faith: A Comparative Study of the Influence of Religious Maximalism on New Ideas of Food Taboo in Some Contemporary Jewish and Muslim Communities

SIMON THEOBALD

*The University of Sydney*

sthe4604@uni.sydney.edu.au

### ABSTRACT

*The encroachment of maximalist thinking in Jewish and Muslim communities globally has been widely noted by scholars across disciplines. To-date, the influence of such thinking on the cultural construction of foodways, particularly food taboos, within these communities has been largely ignored. This article seeks to address shortcomings in this area of research. Using both fieldwork data from communities in Sydney, Australia, and digital ethnography, this article problematizes anthropological material that suggests that kosher and halal necessarily unite diverse co-religionists. Today, fundamentalists within these faith groups use the concept of “stringency” or “exactingness” in association with food preparation and products to reinterpret the concept of taboo. This process undermines normative communal ideation pertaining to food, providing fundamentalists opportunity to reject intra-communal commensality. Taboos then cease to function as a symbolic marker of communal unity, instead serving the anti-pluralist agenda of fundamentalists. In this way, food becomes the symbolic medium through which the discourse of communal legitimacy, authenticity, and purity, is paradoxically both achieved and rejected.*

### Keywords

Halal, Kosher, taboo, food, fundamentalism, authenticity, doubt, purity, *glatt*

## Introduction

In Israel, a young Australian woman visits her brother, a rabbinical student at a local Haredi *yeshiva*, and invites him to a kosher restaurant. He agrees to meet her, but even before the meal arrives, the young *yeshiva bokher* cuts his sister off, insisting upon calling his Rabbi to ensure the food is of the *strictest* standard of kosher certification. Thousands of kilometres away back in Australia, another young woman sits down with an old friend, only to discover that the man who once ate with her will no longer, because he cannot be sure that the food she has cooked is *sufficiently* halal to meet his exacting standards. Throughout this article, I will argue that as part of their anti-pluralist agenda, maximalists have sought to contest and challenge that last mutually agreed symbol of intra-communal unity; food taboo. This process is achieved by introducing into communal discourse the concept of “stringency” in food production and food products, such that some standards of kosher and halal are understood to be more “stringent” or “exacting” others. This reinterpretation negates the semiotic power of taboo as a marker of communal unity, giving fundamentalists scope to both reject intra-communal commensality, and deny the validity, legitimacy, and authenticity of their liberal co-religionists foodways, and by extension, social practice.

To achieve this, this article begins first by offering a critique of the marginalization of food in academic study. I proceed then to outline my research methodologies, and provide a review of functionalist and semiotic literature on food taboos along with a definition of some key terms in order to better acclimatize the reader with the field. The majority of the article is then concerned with a textual analysis of the construction of the emic discourse of stringency, and how these changes are practiced in the community through ethnographic fieldwork data from Jewish and Muslim communities in Sydney. I conclude with a discussion on the social function of re-interpreting taboo as the culinary realization of maximalist/non-liberal opposition to pluralism.

### **The relevance of taboo: Food and fundamentalism in the context of academic research and its relation to this study**

Food is all too often relegated in academic material to the “domestic sub-world of the mundane and unimportant” (Twigg 1979, 13). Food taboos in particular, have been seen as the product only of “primitive” peoples and “primitive” thought (e.g McDonald 1977) and can only be studied through ethnographies of tribal peoples, not as something that contemporary, urbanized societies need to pay heed to (Valerie 2000; Rouse and Hoskins 2004).

And yet food is the one product that all people, regardless of their prohibitions or lifestyles, must make a conscious effort to consume daily. Food taboos similarly continue to inscribe social place and remain a highly potent symbolic system among many communities, as this article and others attest (Barak-Erez 2007; Noor 2009; Gottlieb 2010). It is, as Mauss suggests, a “total social fact” (1954, 1); omnipresent, almost imperceptibly inscribing social roles and motives, yet noticed mainly in scarcity or great abundance. It is perhaps this routine, almost mundane nature, that is responsible for such erasure (Belasco 2008, 2).

Exemplifying this erasure, despite an increasing body of work that focuses on the rise of fundamentalist movements in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century (e.g. Marty and Appleby, 1991–1995), scant attention has been paid to the impact that fundamentalist and maximalist thinking has had on adherence to specific foodways and taboos. With much time spent re-working Huntington’s (1996) thesis from a “class between civilizations” to a “clash within civilizations” (see Bilgrami 2003), it is surprising that more has not been done on how food can serve to delineate the intra-communal fault-lines between fundamentalists and liberal religionists. In the conflict between fundamentalism and liberalism, it is precisely when liberal notions of universalism and pluralism abut particularistic notions of social exclusivism and enclave mentalities, manifested *par excellence* through the gastropolitics of food taboos, that potent intra-communal conflict is engendered. Studying food and the culture surrounding food consumption and creation provides us access to a unique facet and angle of the largely ignored ritual and social practice and politics of maximalist communities, and is therefore a worthy of academic investigation.

**A pan-disciplinary approach: Field ethnography, web ethnography,  
and textual analysis**

The research for this article was necessarily pan-disciplinary. The original method of data collection was inductive and ethnographic, derived primarily from semi-structured interviews conducted in the field with members of the Jewish and Muslim communities of Sydney. Respondents were chosen on their basis of their links within the communities (Masorti/Chabad-Lubavitch Judaism, Bangladeshi diaspora/Anglo-Saxon convert Islam) and their familiarity with the researcher. An interview guide provided the basis for questioning, although all interviews were ultimately open-ended and participants were free to talk on a range of topics, within the limitations of their understanding and participation in community foodways. By virtue of their free-wielding

nature, I have paraphrased most of the interview content. The anecdotal evidence in this paper represents a small vignette of a larger ethnographic project with maximalist Islamic and Jewish communities in the Sydney region. The similarity of described phenomena in these communities encouraged me to pursue a comparative approach, which then provided the impetus for further, digitally mediated research.

Most of the material for discourse analysis was derived from research conducted via the Internet, mostly from public domain material (blogs, institutional websites, etc) so as to avoid the ethical issues associated with “lurking” (e.g Lindemann 2005). Although there has been criticism of the Internet as a medium for authentic research (e.g Helland 2005), I firmly reject the notion that the Internet is somehow inauthentic, and given its increasing ubiquity it seems now impossible to understand urban communities without reference to digital material. As Garcia et al. suggest, “the distinction between online and offline worlds is therefore becoming less useful as activities in these realms become increasingly merged in our society, and as the two spaces interact with and transform each other” (2009, 52–53).

In fact, Garcia et al. stress the importance of digital research to the point that they *insist* that ethnographers “must incorporate the Internet and CMC into their research to adequately understand social life in contemporary society” (2009, 53). They continue “‘Virtual reality’ is not a reality separate from other aspects of human action and experience, but rather a part of it” (Garcia et al. 2009, 54). My approach represents a middle path between purely ethnographic material from the field, and exclusively digital-mediated communication.

### **The contested categories of maximalism, fundamentalism, and liberal movements**

This article is premised on the notion that, although the “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1996) may be an artefact of an essentialist and reductionist worldview, within faith communities different interpretations and manifestations of communal practice do frequently engender conflict. These conflicts typically relate to the degree to which individuals understand integration and assimilation with a wider, networked globe as a phenomena to be embraced, or rejected. Much of this debate is further obfuscated by the contestation of the categories of fundamentalism, maximalism, and liberalism.

In particular, defining what constitutes “fundamentalism” has been an intellectual and social minefield, not least because populations the name is applied to rarely self-identify with that moniker. In her influential paper *An Anthropology of Fundamentalism*, Nagata critiqued both scholarly and popu-

lar overuse of the epithet “fundamentalism,” suggesting that gross overgeneralization risked the term ceasing to have either specificity or explanatory power (Nagata 2001, 481). Marty and Appleby (1993) ultimately concluded that despite the contentious nature of the label, fundamentalist communities are linked by a series of key denominators that transcend a traditional understanding of didactic adherence to the literal truth of revealed text. Fundamentalism is as much, if not more, about identity than it is about text. They contend;

Fundamentalism...describes among other things, a tendency of some members of traditional religious communities to separate from fellow believers and to redefine the sacred community in terms of its disciplined opposition to non-believers and “lukewarm” believers alike. “Fundamentalists” within these historical religious traditions, convinced of the conspiratorial nature of secularists and liberal religionists, adopted a set of strategies for fighting back against what is perceived as a concerted effort by secular states or elements within them to push people of religious consciousness and conscience to the margins of society...all of this unfolded in the name of defending and preserving a hallowed identity rooted in religious tradition but now under assault.

(Marty and Appleby 1995, 1)

For Nagata, fundamentalism is not the exclusive domain of religious communities, but is rather also a label that could be applied to political communities, linguistic, even economic (2001).

Unlike Nagata, and Marty and Appleby, for Mahmood (2005) and Fader (2009), the categories of “fundamentalist” and “maximalist” are always pejorative, carrying too much association with violence in the wake of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks. They advocate instead for the term “non-liberal,” in contrast to liberalism that explicitly connects self-realization and individual autonomy, so that self-realization is founded on realizing what one’s true will desires (Mahmood 2005, 13; Fader 2009, 221).

Non-liberal communities, by comparison, reject the idea that self-realization is found on realising one’s will, but rather suggest that individuals reach their full potential when their behaviour and beliefs reflect agreed communal norms. Individual autonomy and agency is not to be embraced, but rather rejected, because it does not assist with either the maintenance of strong communal borders, or the continuity of the future with the past. As such, non-liberal communities disrupt what Keane calls the “moral narrative of modernity” which emerged out of Western liberal thought, rooted in the Enlightenment and entwined with earlier strands of Protestantism (Keane 2007, 49). Such a narrative of “progress” is associated with urbanization,

industrialization, and secularization, as well as increasing individualism and autonomy (Keane 2007, 46). At its apogee, this narrative declared the individual as the sole “locus of authority and agency over matters personal and communal” (Norman 2009, 162).

Ultimately, while I recognize that these labels can be pejorative, I use them relatively freely to represent individuals, or sub-communal groupings within the faith communities examined, who, for their part attempt to exert what Nagata calls “a possessive control, [that seeks] to define and manage “authenticity” or “aboriginality” and to prevent Others from appropriating these, as part of a bid to take back identity and to limit the ravages of uncontrolled pluralisms and multiculturalisms” (2001, 493). To this end, while it is common in popular discourse to assume that maximalists somehow represent an unbroken lineage with the past, they are actually profoundly modern, indeed, “new” religious movements.

**Die Menschen sind, was sie essen: “Choice meats” and other theorem in scholarly understandings of food and taboo**

Scholarly understandings of the origins and purpose of food taboos have varied markedly throughout history. Two schools of thought predominate, divided loosely between symbolic approaches that understand taboo as part of a semantic web surrounding human social relations, and functionalist approaches that regard purely utilitarian and economic considerations. To this end, approaches interpreting taboo as health regulation (e.g Rappaport 1967; Maimonides cited in Weiss and Butterworth 1975; Speth 1991; Simoons 1994), as an attempt to limit environmental degradation from pig farming in a marginal Middle Eastern climate (Harris 1985), and as an attempt to stymie overconsumption and competition over resources (e.g Ross 1978; Reichel-Dolmatoff 1979; McDonald 1977; Colding and Folke 1997), may all be classified as functionalist. While offering at times both compelling and fascinating insight into perhaps the origin of taboo behaviour, functionalist approaches nevertheless provide no explanatory power in understanding the ideational associations between foodstuffs and the people who consume them. To this end, we must turn to symbolic approaches to taboos, whose interpretation this article is premised on.

Most symbolic approaches to taboo have stressed a relationship between pollution and purity (Smith 1894; Durkheim 1926; Frazer 1927; Douglas 1966). As such, they are typically distinguished by whether the researcher believes the actor is defiled, and those where the actor defiles. Approaches such as Rozin (1999) and Frazer (1927) have argued for taboo as having

a connection to totem and sympathetic magic, while others (Leach 1964; Douglas 1966; Tambiah 1969) see taboo as a response to categorical ambiguity within cultural systems. Resting somewhere between the two camps, Fessler and Navarrate (2003) contend that food taboos (particular taboos on meat) are best understood with a cognitive evolutionary approach, marrying part symbolism and part functionalist approaches. For the purposes of this article, I understand taboo as any ideational system that divides the material universe into polarized immaterial ontological realms—pure and impure—with varying gradations in between, some objects being more pure than others, some more polluting.

The crowning achievement of symbolic approaches is perhaps the elucidation of ideational correspondence between ritual and social impurity. As Douglas suggests, the rituals and signifiers of purity and impurity (i.e. taboo) “enact the form of social relations and in giving these relations visible expression they enable people to know their own society. The rituals work upon the body politic through the symbolic medium of the physical body” (1966, 129). Most subsequent semiotic work on taboos and food have, to greater or lesser degrees, agreed with the premise that through food taboos, the ritual and the social are woven into each other. As Valerie suggests, “the whole field of taboo is characterized by the blending of the physical and the moral” (2000, 43).

To this end however, the overwhelming body of subsequent work on taboos has worked on the perhaps logical, but limiting presumption that these semiotic markers necessarily serve the cause of community unity and cohesion, contra an extra-communal other. For example, in his recent analysis, Meyer-Rochow states, that food taboos:

aids [sic] cohesion of this group, helps that group stand out among others, assists that group to maintain its identity and creating a feeling of “belonging.” Thus, taboos can strengthen the confidence of a group by functioning as a demonstration of the uniqueness of the group in the face of others.

(Meyer-Rochow 2009, 27)

Niehof goes even further, suggesting “universally, food is used to signify the bonds between people; sharing a meal denotes a social relationship...through food social cohesion is strengthened” (2010, 21).

Amongst specific Muslim and Jewish communities, Kifleyesus” (2002, 246) study of the Muslim Argobba ethnic community of Ethiopia notes that when living among the Christian Amhara, *halal* becomes the primary means of ensuring communal unity and identification. Moreover, ethnic identity or kinship is subordinate to the unity derived from foodways; “food, not

blood, is then the tie that binds” (Kifleyesus 2002, 250). In their more recent treatment of food taboos amongst African American Muslims, Rouse and Hoskins argue that “contemporary practitioners of Sunni Islam see food taboos as a way of reaffirming their heritage within a much wider religious tradition” (2004, 246).

Similarly, in her study on Middle Eastern Jewish women’s cooking, Sered contends that these women (predominantly Moroccan, Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, Syrian, and Yemenite) understand *kashrut* as

what differentiates Jews from non-Jews...they stress, however, that they themselves would not eat “Arab food.” The two categories, people with whom one eats versus others with whom one does not eat, are critical to the women’s understanding of Judaism: one’s Jewish identity—what one eats—limits the depths of one’s interpersonal relationships. (Sered 1988, 132)

Buckser, citing Zborowoski and Herzog (1952) asserts that in pre-modern Europe, the *kashrut* regulations were “one of the key mechanisms through which group cohesion and isolation were maintained” (1999, 195). He continues

kosher observance remains important among the Copenhagen Jews. This is true not because most of them practice it, nor because they agree on what is important about it; but dietary law remains one of the few symbolic systems which all of them recognize, and through which all of them can express their Jewish identity. (Buckser 1999, 195)

These statements are doubtlessly all correct. Taboos, in this case *halal* and *kashrut* and their associated purity strictures, functioned historically as a powerful semiotic marker of communal unity, even if they were not and are not particularly strictly adhered to in practice. However, such semiotic power is predicated then if not on a uniformity of adherence, which typically differs among individuals, but rather uniformity of normative communal beliefs pertaining to taboo. If Buckser and like-minded scholars are correct, kosher is always kosher, halal is always halal, and taboo is always taboo; their semiotic function remains unchanged, because all Jews and Muslims *believe* the same thing about them.

Many scholars have recognized however, that food can be used to serve the cause of communal conflict and dominance (e.g. Young 1971; Appadurai 1981; Mars 1997; Watson et al. 2005). Young’s description of the Massim practice of ‘*vemunumunuya au’a aiya’aine*’ “hitting/fighting/killing with food” (1971), described the use of food as a political process and mechanism of social control. In his seminal work, *Gastro-politics in Hindu South Asia* (1981), Appadurai coined the term “gastro-politics” in order to describe the phenom-



enon of “conflict or competition over specific cultural or economic resources as it emerges in social transactions around food” (1981, 495). Much subsequent work has been done in this field, however, in most instances this work on “fighting with food,” has tended to be case specific, without reference to comparative schema (e.g Kraemer 2007), or much link to the concept of taboos in food. Indeed, explicit mention of “taboo” is often curiously absent, perhaps because it is assumed that, in communities with a textual tradition, the parameters of taboo are fixed and immutable.

What I hope to make clear in the subsequent pages is that that the semiotic potency of taboo in unifying communities is, contrary to received wisdom, actually a contestable category. By creating alternative definitions of taboo, premised on “stringency,” maximalists effectively deny the equality of normative belief about food taboos, rendering kosher not kosher, halal no longer halal, and taboos no more the mutually agreed upon and singular marker for all members of a religious community. The following paragraphs explain the process by which the emic discourse of “stringency” or “exactingness” is created and justified within the parameters of the faith community.

#### Writing the divided table: The legal hermeneutic of “stringency” as the foundation for re-framing taboos

Anthropologists are blessed by the fact that in contemporary Jewish communities, the emerging foodway referred to in emic discourse as *glatt kosher* provides fertile material for an analysis of the creative re-definition of taboo. In rabbinical writings, the performative intention of the individual fulfilling a *mitzvah* has been divided between those who perform the commandments with only the minimum amount of ritual required, and those who “embellish” or “beautify” the commandment with their zealous attention to detail (Eider 2002). Such zealousness has been termed *mehadrin* (and zealousness beyond *mehadrin* is *mehadrin min hamehadrin*), and theoretically any of the 613 *mitzvot* could be performed in a *mehadrin* manner if they are performed with a sense of “conscientiousness and splendid manner” (Schneerson n.d.). In regards to kosher food production, marking a product as *kosher l'mehadrin* indicates that the producer was unfalteringly scrupulous in their adherence to the most rigorous halakhic standards.

Historically, *glatt* was a Yiddish term meaning “smooth” (Steinmetz 1981, 9). If meat is to be certified kosher, it must first be derived from a kosher animal, and secondly, slaughtered in the ritual manner (*shechita*) by a specially trained butcher (*shochet*)—a process which carries a multitude of rules and regulations (Marks 2010, 551). Once the meat has been prepared, the lungs are

then examined to determine whether they are *glatt*, i.e. without defect, or *treif*, which would render them unacceptable (Zivotofsky 1999). The minutiae of the *halakha* however, allows for certain leniencies and so long as small adhesions on the lung could be removed (“peeled”) by a *shochet*, the meat was permissibly kosher, albeit not *glatt* (Zivotofsky 1999). Following Ashkenazi communal norms, non-*glatt* meat is therefore still completely and authentically kosher.

Traditionally, insistence on adherence to the *glatt* ruling amongst Ashkenazim was a hallmark only of the most isolationist and conservative communities, particularly those Hasidic dynasties of Eastern Europe transplanted to New York City and beyond, and applied predominantly to meat products and *Chalav Yisroel* (Poll 1969). Kraemer notes that even as little as thirty years ago, *kashrut* standards were both unremarkable and uncontested in the Orthodox community and beyond (2009, 147). However, in 1978, the Lubavitcher Hasidim dis-endorsed the *hashgacha* of “Kaf K” “Diamond K” and “Triangle K” certifies, sparking what Kramer has referred to as “the kosher wars” (2009, 148). Since the 1990s however, there has been a merging of terminology so that the legal distinction between *glatt* and *mehadrin* has collapsed, with both terms now synonymous with foodways premised on the belief that all consumables earmarked as such are produced according to only the most “exacting” standards.

It is more difficult to describe a comparably organized pedigree of thought pertaining to “stringency” within the *shariah*—as the corpus of Islamic texts and the nature of Muslim jurisprudence has not lent itself to the same obsessive attention to minutiae that characterizes rabbinic exegesis. Nevertheless, the same *fundamental process*, that is the re-definition of the parameters of taboo, framed as a matter of exactingness is adherence to religious law, takes place in the Muslim communities as much as it does within the Jewish communities.

Historically, consensus on food production was derived from the statutes of whichever *madhab* happened to predominate in the geographic locale of the community, even though the *ijma* insists that the layman bares no allegiance to any particular *madhab*, only the Prophet and the Qur’an (see Peters, 1980). In the more globalized contemporary, Muslims are freer to choose from which ever of the schools of jurisprudence they prefer. This diffuse and anti-hierarchical nature of scholarship in the Islamic world therefore provides intellectual and cultural space for maximalist groups to establish such regimens. Three specific themes—the permissibility of food slaughtered by non-Muslims, the point of invocation of the name of God, and the addition of preservatives and other additives in food, provides ample ground for the emergence of “stringencies” within the globalized Muslim *ummah*.

For Muslims living in the diaspora, acceptance of *dhabihah* (the method of ritual slaughter) is a fraught battleground. Because the *Qur'an* allows for the consumption of meat slaughtered by the *ahl-al-Kitab* (People of the Book—primarily Christians and Jews), some Muslims living in predominantly Christian countries in the West have been willing to accept meat slaughtered in abattoirs (Regenstein et al. 2003, 122), on the assumption that employees would be nominally monotheists—a necessary condition. While historically most of these countries were populated exclusively by Christians (with tiny minorities of Jews), rendering the meat they slaughtered *theoretically* acceptable, the rise of irreligiosity and secularism in the post-enlightenment period has placed Muslim minorities living in the West in a quandary where they cannot be certain that slaughterhouse workers are members of the *ahl-al-Kitab*, or non-religious (*mushrikun*), or possibly members of communities that have unacceptable theological concepts (neo-pagans, Hindus, Buddhists, animists (“The Learner” 2004). The acceptance of *dhabihah* is further complicated by the method of slaughter, with the *ulema* and the *ummah* split over whether stunning animals prior to slaughter (as is common in most Western abattoirs) and the use of mechanical slaughtering methods constitutes a breach of the invocation against eating carrion (Qaradawi 2009, 61–62).

Further cause for contest derives from the point at which the *bismillah* invocation is made (Qaradawi 2009, 56–57). Maximalists are loath to accept the *bismillah* at any point other than immediately prior to slaughter, while liberals have pointed to the more lenient *Hadith* of Sahih al-Bukhari (Qaradawi 2009, 56–57). On this basis, there has been a willingness among liberal Muslims to accept any non-pork, non-carrion meat, simply by saying the *bismillah* at the point of consumption (Abdullah 2009). Many liberal Muslims also point to the *dhabihah* method as a matter of tradition, rather than Qur'anic proscription, and as such do not see adhering to it as *fard* (obligatory) (Abdullah 2009).

Beyond the issues of meat standards, it has been the use of additives and preservatives as the by-product of mass production that has provided the greatest place for “stringencies” to emerge. The presence of certain emulsifiers, rennet in cheese, and other agents that are either specifically or accidentally added to products (akin to the warning on most chocolates that the product may contain nuts) has divided the Muslim community over whether mass produced consumables which did not historically contain *haram* products may now be rendered as such by accidental contact with them, even if in minute amounts (see Regenstein et al. 2003, 123; Chaudry and Riaz 2004; Murugaiah et al. 2009). Of particular concern are additives that can

be derived from pig fat—especially gelatine—with many Islamic institutions now offering congregants a list of food additives that may be considered halal or *haram* (Chaudry and Riaz 2004; Rahman 2006). As a response, some Muslims have been inclined to eat kosher products as a way of preventing the possibility of admixture with *haram* products, although Muslims are warned to be wary of the possible presence of alcohol (Kazi 2003).

The kind of legalism widely noted in Jewish communities (e.g. Heilmann 2006), clearly does not exist to the same degree in Islamic communities. Nevertheless, stringency can still be created, pointing to the ultimately “constructed” nature of such discourse. Moreover, such thinking provides the justification for reinterpretation, and while the *shariah* may lack the corpus of texts and minutiae necessary to provide a rationalized answer as per the case of *halakha*, the end result, as shall be made clear, is the same.

### Of kosher apples and halal oranges

The discourse of stringency serves to create “new categories” of what may and may not be defined as kosher or halal. To this end, it is now quite common to find products that would once have been understood as taboo-neutral (neither pure nor impure) or inherently pure to now have a kosher sticker or a halal stamp. Particularly, items such as vegetables, fruit, and water, all categories that were once naturally taboo-neutral or inherently pure, now frequently receive both kosher and halal certification (Adelson 2010; Morton 2010). Even that archetypally kosher cuisine—bagels with lox—is no longer free from doubt (Butler 2010). Today, the *glatt* epithet in particular is the standard bearer of maximalist ideas about food products; an archetypal “brand.” Consumers can be in no doubt that a *glatt kosher* product will be *mehadrin*, and need not worry about the *sufek* of such unscrupulous *mashgichim* who certify products as merely standard kosher. As the Mehadrin Dairy site attests:

Each item is scrutinized, with both the company and food itself undergoing a rigorous evaluation process before being accepted into the MEHADRID family of food products, with the majority of candidates being rejected for sub-standard performance. (Mehadrin Dairy 2012)

Such brand power means that now restaurants, caterers, and shops today identify their whole product range as such. Concerned consumers can go on package *glatt kosher* holidays (Kosherica.com 2010; Kosher Expeditions 2005). In Israel, travel agents now offer advice and listings of hotels that are exclusively *glatt kosher* (Hotels of Israel 2000).

**“Is it glatt?”: The impact of taboo re-definition on commensality**

Re-categorization has ramifications that extend beyond purely material considerations, as the new ritual signifiers of purity serve to enact the social relations of maximalists. By underwriting shared communal beliefs about taboo, fundamentalists are afforded both opportunity and scope to de-legitimize that most important of communal rituals; the shared table. When there is no longer an agreed upon understanding of taboo, intra-communal commensality becomes difficult, limited, and contested. In Nasir and Periera’s (2008) treatment of defensive dining among Malay Muslims in Singapore, they note that self-identifying pious Muslims abstain from eating if they are concerned about the slightest doubt about halal certification, but with no reference to what this may mean in terms of intra-communal commensality. Below I use ethnographic anecdotes to illustrate the impact of taboo redefinition on commensality.

Khan (2010), an Australian-born Muslim Bangladeshi professional in her mid-30s, describes a dinner with an old friend, Muhammad (also a Bangladeshi-Australian Muslim) who attended her wedding some ten years earlier. For Khan and her husband, the need to eat *halal* was sufficiently important that they sought the advice of a *qadi* in determining the acceptability of meat slaughtered in the diaspora. The meat at the wedding was all *halal*-certified, and all guests partook of the meal, sharing happily in this joyous occasion. However, when Khan met again with Muhammad, at a restaurant that was certified halal, he responded with discomfort about the acceptability of the food. In response, Khan suggested that perhaps they should avoid bothering to eat meat on this occasion, if Muhammad was uncomfortable with the acceptability of the slaughter. Muhammad replied that eating vegetarian is not sufficient; he is simply too concerned about the acceptability of e-numbers and other chemical additives in any of the foods available for him to be comfortable eating at the venue at all. Khan expressed her concern to Muhammad about his apparently narrow interpretation of the jurisprudence of *halal*, and he in turn criticized her observance, suggesting that she lacked piety. The pair found themselves at an impasse; unable to start their meal, both uncomfortable with the other, they called off their friendship (Khan, personal communication, 17/4/2010).

Fatimah is the daughter of a non-religious Australian Anglo-Saxon couple, who after spending some time in Indonesia as a Baptist missionary, ultimately converted to Islam with her spouse (Dennison, personal communication, 20/4/2010). While they have since divorced, she has developed an increasingly rigid interpretation of Islam under the persuasion of fundamen-

talist cultural influence. Her current husband, with whom she has a number of children (in addition to a daughter from a previous marriage), shares her views. While her parents may have initially been uncomfortable with her conversion, they ultimately accepted it, and have maintained a happy relationship until relatively recently. However, at a recent communal dinner with her family and other Muslim friends, the seemingly innocuous and neutral category of “crockery” is roped into Fatimah’s increasingly “stringent” interpretation of the jurisprudence of *halal*. While Fatimah’s parents happily serve *halal* food to their Muslim dinner guests, Fatimah herself proceeds to wrap in plastic cling-film all the porcelain crockery her children and spouse will be eating from. After this, Fatimah publically informs her mother that the food they have prepared is no longer acceptable for her family, and the plates themselves are potentially contaminated (despite being freshly machine washed) and must be wrapped so as to make sure her children and husband have no contact with pork or alcohol residues, or any other *haram* substances. She then takes out her own pre-prepared food, and she and her family proceed to eat on the cling-wrapped plates. The other Muslims at the table protest; surely this behaviour is ridiculous, particularly when Fatimah’s parents have ensured that the meat is halal, and that the plates are machine-washed? Fatimah retorts that if they are willing to accept such doubt, they are more than welcome, but she and her family are not.

We find a similar repetition of themes in the lived experience of Jewish communities. Cohen (2010), a self-described “bad Jew” and the daughter of a Reform convert and a Jewish-by-birth father (a “dubious” category in maximalist thinking) allows herself such leniency with the laws of *kasbruth* that she will happily consume pork products outside the home, however the boundary of her apartment is a sacrosanct frontier through which *treif* food-stuffs do not pass. Her extended family, by comparison, are Orthodox, and have recently begun the transition to a *glatt* diet, and its associated purity restrictions. When Cohen visited her cousin, Miriam, she accidentally placed a *dairy* mug in the *meat* sink. Realising her mistake, Cohen apologized to her cousin, but Miriam took the mug, and smashed it. Miriam then proceeded to smash the entire set of crockery that came with the mug—despite their apparent lack of contamination (none of the other items in the “milk” set have touched the “meat” sink, only the mug), they have nevertheless been defiled. When Cohen asked why the rest of the set needed to be destroyed, Miriam’s rejoinder was that, just because the mug alone may be good enough for Cohen, because *her* (Miriam’s) family was so righteous, the entire set must be destroyed. Cohen left immediately, shaken by this apparent display of

gastro-political domination, referring to the incident amongst her friends as “emotional blackmail” (Cohen, personal communication, 19/4/2010).

For Mierowsky (personal communication, 23/4/2010), an Australian Jew of South African heritage, a trip to Israel offers her the chance to meet up and try and improve relations with her brother, Yisroel.<sup>1</sup> The siblings were close in their youth as they grew up on beachfront Perth, with only a minimal interest in their Jewish heritage. However, a trip to Israel and a mystical experience at Jerusalem as a nineteen year old transformed Yisroel from a non-observant teen to a pious *yeshiva bokher*, now on the path towards a Lubavitch *smicha* (rabbinical ordination). Since that time, relations between Mierowsky and her brother have been more difficult, although she is determined to make amends when she arrives in Israel. She rings in advance, and suggests to Yisroel that they meet at a local café in Jerusalem, one that she has already assessed is kosher. Yisroel agrees, and they meet up the next day. As they are about to take their seats, Yisroel is concerned. He is unsure of the *kashrut* authority that has certified the restaurant, and insists that he must ring his Rabbi to check that the *mashgiach* has been scrupulous in his dealings. Mierowsky insists that, given it has been months since they last saw each other, perhaps he should not bother with calling his Rabbi, and simply order a salad, and enjoy her company without worry. Yisroel argues that even salad is not neutral, he cannot be sure that the vegetables have themselves been prepared in accordance with the meticulous Lubavitch standard. Mierowsky is distressed, arguing that such behaviour is designed to guilt her, despite her best efforts to meet Yisroel on terms that were acceptable to him. Yisroel replies; compromise is not possible, and her decision to eat here is indicative of her lack of commitment to Judaism and her compromise with non-Jews, amongst them, her fiancé. She is, he says “like a princess who doesn’t understand that she’s behaving like a commoner” (Mierowsky, personal communication, 23/4/2010). Deeply offended and hurt by her brother’s behaviour, Mierowsky left.

While the particulars of each story may differ slightly, all examples are unified by the related theme of commensality denied, or contested on the basis of the failure of an individual (and by extension, group) to adhere to the maximalist’s exacting (re-defined) standard of taboo. As such, these examples illustrate how this concept of “stringency” undermines commensality. Relationships characterized previously by equality, intimacy, and solidarity (whether family, friend, or simply co-religionist) are transformed into rela-

---

1. Not his real name.

tionships characterized by rank, distance, and segmentation. Moreover, in each instance, the rejection of commensality becomes both an implicit and explicit comment on the non-adherents” more general commitment to an “authentic” or “legitimate” (pure) religious practice. In the final paragraphs, I make clear that this reinterpretation of taboo represent the gastronomic manifestation of the fundamentalists” muscular identity and uncompromising, anti-pluralist agenda, and the medium through which they undermine the authenticity of those who do not adhere to their practice.

**The battle for social legitimacy and authenticity: The idea of doubt or impurity and the semiotic power of re-interpreting taboo**

For maximalists, food represent that last bastion of communal unity that must be destroyed in order to fully realize their foundational narrative—that modernity is polluted and its advocates defiling agents; two things which must be actively fought against. The symbolic reinterpretation of food taboo is then the culinary embodiment of that retort to liberal notions of pluralism.<sup>2</sup> Liberalism—and its pluralist baggage—are ultimately to be rejected, and by reinterpreting taboo, food becomes the semiotic medium through which the politics of communal legitimacy are played out. Below I relate how by denying intra-communal commensality, maximalists are able to de-stabilize the foodways, and by extension, social legitimacy, of liberal communities.

For all that maximalists may claim to be undisturbed by liberal manifestations of their faith communities, the liberal project of self-realization and individuation does challenge non-liberal communal narratives, particularly when as Marty and Appleby note, fundamentalisms often assume a shadowy liberal conspiracy to marginalize them (1995, 1). In most regards, maximalists manage to disassociate themselves from their liberal co-religionists, e.g, not officiating at weddings, refusal to attend liberal houses of worship, etc as part of their self-perception as fighting back against secularism (Heilman and Friedman 1991). However as noted previously in this article, food taboos still retain some semiotic power in expressing if not always uniform practice, at the very least normative communal attitudes, about the rules and regulations relating to that most important of communal rituals—the shared table. In this regard, kosher and halal are the archetypal signifiers of that which may be seen as “fit” and “pure” within the community. By challenging these norma-

---

2. The development of the *ultra* and *glatt* foodways should also indicate the degree to which, for all that maximalist movements may claim historical lineage and scrupulous adherence to an unbroken chain of tradition, they are as much products of modernity in the same way that the liberal religious communities they decry are.



tive beliefs concerning food preparation, food ceases to be both equal and an equalizer, and maximalists free themselves of any potential commensal interaction with their liberal co-religionists. Kosher is no longer just kosher, and halal is no longer halal. Taboos cease to serve any purpose as semiotic markers of communal unity. Now, there is *glatt* kosher, and kosher, *ultra* halal, and halal—two different taboos that now operate in contest with one another within the broader faith community.

By creating these competing intra-communal categories of taboo, maximalists force all Muslims and Jews, even if they *already* regard themselves as religious, to query *all* intra-communal commensal interaction, asking the question “is the meal we are about to eat, *sufficiently* kosher or halal, to be acceptable for my fellow consumers?” If commensality is rejected, the spurned consumer is forced to ask the further question: “if this food is unacceptable to my co-religionists, what does this say about the legitimacy or purity of my religious practice?”

Because commensality is such a *fundamental* communal ritual, and because as food functions as such a powerful marker of place in the social order, any individual or group that is willing to accept *doubt* in such an important ritual and social activity as eating and enjoying a meal, must be willing to accept doubt in other areas as well. By re-framing the change in definition of taboo as a matter of stringency, maximalists create in the mind of the consumer, an equivalence between doubt about liberal food, and corresponding doubt about social and moral purity. Doubt becomes the defiling agent.

Mars suggests that:

The ability to supply and to dictate the diet of another person or group is an indication of power and dominance. Such an individual or group controls that situation of relationship. The recipient of the prescribed diet can literally either lump it or leave it, that is acquiesce or rebel. If they acquiesce then subordination is accepted and the legitimacy of the provider’s power is acknowledged.

(1997, 200)

The maximalist challenge to normative constructs of taboo offers liberals (or indeed, anyone who does not accept the maximalist dictates) two options; accept the new taboos, or reject them. However, this is where such framing is such a successful means of undermining the legitimacy of liberal foodways. Liberal co-religionists are hamstrung in their eating habits because, if they accept the maximalist taboo they are required to submit to their social control. But because the discourse of stringency frames non-adherence as symptomatic of a lack of piety and scrupulousness, as a matter of *impurity*, such rebelliousness makes liberal practice food practices less legitimate, less

authentic, and ultimately, defiling. Liberal Jews and Muslims may continue to eat their standard of *kosher* and *halal*, but maximalist discourse leaves them in no doubt; it is neither a legitimate nor authentic standard. Rather, it is a standard that defiles the sacred body.

Paradoxically, this idea of stringencies also serves to both validate and valorize the maximalists' community. "Stringency" makes food the "unsubsumable Other to the dominant culture of the modern West...the authentic embodiment of difference that the great equalizing engine of modern culture would annihilate, and the means of restoring to itself the shattered totality of life in modernity" (Mufti 2000, 88). Such stringencies display through ritual purity both the moral purity and virtues of the adherent, showcasing the power, prestige, and ultimately, the supremacy of the maximalists' "beautiful religion" (Khan, personal communication, 17/4/2010).

### Conclusion

Foods, and particularly food taboos, are in most sociological and anthropological literature, and the hallmarks of unity; communities are united by both the meals that they share, and their common beliefs about food. Yet food, and control over diets, can also be a powerful mechanism for intra-communal division and dominance. In their contestation of the ideation of taboo, maximalists exemplify the potency of consumable materials in constructing those divisions. By depriving both individuals and communities of their ability to partake in such a foundational act as the sharing of a meal, maximalists send a power message about their understanding of intra-communal pluralism: non-adherence is unacceptable. To some degree, this paper should therefore confirm a fundamental truth about food taboos; they do indeed mark adherence to a community, albeit in this instance the narrow community imagined by maximalists. However, taboos prove to be far more complex, far more mutable, and far more explosive, than previous literature would suggest. By pressganging taboo into their anti-pluralist agenda, maximalists boldly and brazenly reject thousands of years of accumulated tradition and belief, both scholarly and from within their own communities. Where the normative ideation surrounding taboo may have once indicated ones' broader affiliation with and legitimacy as part of a faith community, today aggressive maximalists need simply ask: "Do you adhere to our standard?"—to raise the spectre of social doubt and illegitimacy, thereby nullifying intra-communal harmony. In these instances, food is ultimately, the tie that unbinds.

## References

Abdullah, Husain.

- 2009 "The Difference between Halal and Dhabiha or Zabiha." Online URL <http://blogs.muxlim.com/HusainAbdullah/the-difference-between-halal-and-dhabiha-or-zabiha/>.

Adelson, Seth.

- 2010 "Shabbat Hol Hamoed Pesah 5770: Apples and Fundamentalism." Online URL: <http://themodernrabbi.blogspot.com.au/2010/04/shabbat-hol-hamoed-pesah-5770-apples.html>.

Barak-Erez, Daphne.

- 2007 *Outlawed Pigs: Law, Religion, and Culture in Israel*. London: University of Wisconsin Press.

Belasco, Warren.

- 2008 *Food: The Key Concepts*. New York: Berg.

Bilgrami, Akeel.

- 2003 "The Clash Within Civilizations." *Daedalus* 132(3): 88–93.

Buckser, Andrew.

- 1999 "Keeping Kosher and Eating Kosher: Social Identity among the Jews of Denmark." *Ethnology* 38(1):191–209. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3773813>

Butler, Erica.

- 2010 "Rabbis Claim Lox No Longer Kosher." Online URL: <http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Rabbis-Claim-Lox-No-Longer-Kosher-86905912.html>.

Chaudry, Muhammad M. and Mian N. Riaz.

- 2004 *Halal Food Production*. London: CRC Press.

Colding, J. and C. Folke.

- 1997 "The Relations Among Threatened Species, their Protection, and Taboos." *Conservation Ecology (online)* 1(1): 6.

Douglas, Mary.

- 1966 *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of concepts of Pollution and Taboo*. London: Routledge. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203361832>

Durkheim, E.

- 1926 *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. Translated by J.W. Swain. New York: Macmillan.

Fertig, Maya.

- 2009 "Different From All Other Years: Streit's Matzo Off Preferred List in Five Towns in Queens." Online URL <http://thejewishstar.wordpress.com/2009/04/07/different-from-all-other-years-streit%E2%80%99s-matzo-off-preferred-list-in-five-towns/>.

Fessler, Daniel M.T and Carlos David Navarrete.

- 2003 "Meat is Good to Taboo: Dietary Proscriptions as a Product of the Interaction of Psychological Mechanisms and Social Processes." *Journal of Cognition and Culture* 3(1): 1–40. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853703321598563>

Frazer, J.G.

- 1927 *The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion*. New York: Macmillan.

Garcia, Angela Cora, Alecea I. Standlee, Jennifer Bechkooff and Yan Cui.

- 2009 "Ethnographic Approaches to the Internet and Computer-Mediated Communication." *Ethnography* 38(1)52–84. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0891241607310839>

Gottlieb, Yaron.

- 2010 "Copyrighting a Sectarian Minefield" Online URL <http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/contributors/copyrighting-kosher-a-sectarian-minefield-20100527-wh7j.html>.

Harris, Marvin.

- 1989 [1974] *Cows, Pigs, Wars, and Witches*. New York, Vintage Books.

Heilman, Samuel C.

- 2006 *Sliding to the Right: The Contest for the Future of American Jewish Orthodoxy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Heilman, Samuel C. and Menachem Friedman.

- 1991 "Religious Fundamentalism and Religious Jews: The Case of the Haredim." In *Fundamentalism Observed*, edited by Marty, Martin E. and Appleby, R.Scott, 197–264. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Helland, Christopher.

- 2005 "Online Religion as Lived Religion. Methodological Issues in the Study of Religious Participation on the Internet." *Online—Heidelberg Journal of Religions on the Internet*. 1(1):1–16.

Hotels of Israel.

- 2000 "Glatt Kosher Hotels in Jerusalem." Online URL [http://www.hotels-of-israel.com/glatt\\_kosher\\_hotels\\_in\\_jerusalem.htm](http://www.hotels-of-israel.com/glatt_kosher_hotels_in_jerusalem.htm).

Kazi.

- 2003 "Eating Kosher Meat." Online URL [http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-English-Ask\\_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503547478](http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-English-Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503547478)

Kifleyesus, Abbebe.

- 2002 "Muslims and Meals: The Social and Symbolic Function of Foods in Changing Socio-Economic Environments." *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 72(2): 245–276. <http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/afr.2002.72.2.245>

Kosherica.com.

- 1995 "Kosherica—The Glatt Kosher Cruise Leader." Online URL <http://www.kosherica.com/>

Kraemer, David.

- 2009 [2007] *Jewish Eating and Identity Through the Ages*. New York: Routledge.

Lindemann, K.

- 2005 "Live(s) Online: Narrative Performance, Presence, and Community in LiveJournal.com." *Text and Performance Quarterly* 25: 354–372. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10462930500362494>

Leach, E.R.

- 1964 "Anthropological Aspects of Language: Animal Categories and Verbal Abuse." In *New directions in the study of language*, edited by E.H Lenneberg, 22–63. Cambridge, MA; MIT Press.

Marks, Gil.

- 2010 *Encyclopedia of Jewish Food*. New Jersey: Wiley and Sons.

McDonald, David R.

- 1977 "Food Taboos: A Primitive Environmental Protection Agency" (South America). *Anthropos* 72(5): 734–748.

Mauss, Marcel.

- 1954 *The Gift*. London: Cohen and West.

Morton, Shafiq.

- 2010 "Throwing Rocks at the Moon: The Question of Halal Water." Online URL: <http://www.crescentsofbrisbane.org/00%20Files%20%20Images/CCN286/Throwingrocksatthemoon-shafiqmorton.pdf>.

Meyer-Rochow, Victor Beno.

- 2009 "Food Taboos: Their Origins and Purposes." *Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine* 5(1): 18–28. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1746-4269-5-18>

Mufti, Aamir R.

- 2000 "The Aura of Authenticity." *Social Text* 18(3): 87–103. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/01642472-18-3\\_64-87](http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/01642472-18-3_64-87)

Murugaiah, C., Z. M. Noor, M. Mastakim, L. M. Bilung, and J. Radu.

- 2009 "Species Identification and Halal Authentication Analysis Using Mitochondrial DNA." *Meat Science* 83(1): 57–61. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.meatsci.2009.03.015>

Nasir, K. and A. Pereira.

- 2008 "Defensive Dining: Notes on the Public Dining Experiences in Singapore." *Contemporary Islam* 2: 61–73. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11562-007-0033-8>

Niehof, Anke.

- 2010 *Food, Diversity, Vulnerability, and Social Change: Research Findings from Insular Southeast Asia*. Wageningen, Wagenigen Academic Publishers.

Noor, Fauziah.

- 2009 "The Importance of Halal in Islamic Law and Muslim life: Fundamental Principles and Cardinal Values Pertaining to Human Welfare." *Halal Pages* 12–17.

Peters, Rudolph.

- 1980 "Idjihad and Taqlid in 18th and 19th Century Islam." *Die Welt des Islams* 20(3/4): 131–145. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1569501>

Poll, Solomon.

- 1969 *The Hasidic Community of Williamsburg*. New York: Schocken Books.

Qaradawi, Al-, Yusuf.

- 2009 [1985] *The Lawful and The Prohibited in Islam*. Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust.

Rahman, Siti Zawiah.

- 2006 "Your Online Halal Gelatine." Online URL <http://www.halalgelatine.com/>.

Rappaport, R.A.

- 1967 "Ritual Regulation of Environmental Relations Among a New Guinea People." *Ethnology* 6(1): 17–30. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3772735>

Reichel-Dolmatoff, G.

- 1979 "Desana Animal Categories, Food Restrictions and the Concept of Color Energies." *Journal of Latin American Lore* 4(2): 243–291.

Regenstein, J.M., M.M. Chaudry and C.E. Regenstein.

2003 "The Kosher and Halal Food Laws." *Comprehensive Reviews in Food Safety* 2: 111–127. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-4337.2003.tb00018.x>

Ross, E.

1978 "Food Taboos, Diet, and Hunting Strategy: The Adaption to Animals In Amazon Cultural Ecology." *Current anthropology* 19(1): 1–16. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/201999>

Rouse, Carolyn, and Janet Hoskins.

2004 "Purity, Soul Food, and Sunni Islam: Explorations at the Intersection of Consumption and Resistance." *Cultural Anthropology* 19(2): 226–249. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/can.2004.19.2.226>

Rozin, P.

1999 "Food is Fundamental, Fun, Frightening, and Far Reaching." *Social Research* 66(1): 9–30.

Schneerson, Menachem Mendel.

n.d. "How Many Lights?" Online URL [http://www.chabad.org/holidays/chanukah/article\\_cdo/aid/104113/jewish/How-Many-Lights.htm](http://www.chabad.org/holidays/chanukah/article_cdo/aid/104113/jewish/How-Many-Lights.htm).

Silberberg, Naftali.

n.d. "What is "Mehadrin" kosher?" Online URL <http://www.askmoses.com/en/article/259,42956/What-is-Mehadrin-Kosher.html>

Simoons, F.J.

1994 *Eat Not This Flesh: Food Avoidances from Prehistory to the Present*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Smith, W.R.

1894 *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*. London: A. & C. Black.

Speth, J.D.

1991 "Protein Selection and Avoidance Strategies of Cotemporary and Ancestral Foragers: Unresolved Issues." *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Biological Sciences* 334(1270): 265–269. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.1991.0115>

Steinmetz, Sol.

1981 "Jewish English in the United States." *American Speech* 56(1): 3–16. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/454475>

"The Learner."

2004 "Are Christians "Mushrik" (Polytheists) or "Kafirs" (Rejecters)?" Online

URL <http://www.understanding-islam.com/ro/or-011.htm>.

Tambiah, S.J.

1991 *Sri Lanka, Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Twigg, Julia.

1979 "Food for thought: Purity and Vegetarianism." *Religion* 9: 13–35. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0048-721X\(79\)90051-4](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0048-721X(79)90051-4)

Valeri, Valeria.

2000 *Forest of Taboos: Morality, Hunting, and Identity Among the Huaulu of the Moluccas*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Weiss, Raymond L. and Charles Butterworth.

1975 *Ethical Writings of Maimonides*. New York: New York University Press.

Young, Michael W.

2009 [1971] *Fighting with Food: Leadership, Values, and Social Control in a Muslim Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zivotofsky, Ari Z.

1999 "What's the truth about glatt kosher?" Online URL <http://www.kashrut.com/articles/glatt/>.